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Abstract—Deep neural networks enjoy a powerful represen-
tation and have proven effective in a number of applications.
However, recent advances show that deep neural networks are
vulnerable to adversarial attacks incurred by the so-called
adversarial examples. Although the adversarial example is only
slightly different from the input sample, the neural network
classifies it as the wrong class. In order to alleviate this problem,
we propose the Deep Minimax Probability Machine (DeepMPM),
which applies MPM to deep neural networks in an end-to-end
fashion. In a worst-case scenario, MPM tries to minimize an
upper bound of misclassification probabilities, considering the
global information (i.e., mean and covariance information of each
class). DeepMPM can be more robust since it learns the worst-
case bound on the probability of misclassification of future data.
Experiments on two real-world datasets can achieve comparable
classification performance with CNN, while can be more robust
on adversarial attacks.
Index Terms—deep neural networks, adversarial attacks, mim-
imax probability machine
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are adept at learning effective
representation and have demonstrated significant success in a
wide variety of applications, such as image classification [1],
speech recognition [2], [3] and language translation [4], [5].
However, recent advances show that they are vulnerable to
adversarial examples, which are augmented samples perturbed
imperceptibly but able to mislead the predictions of the neural
networks [6]–[8]. The existence of this issue prevents us from
applying them to security-related applications, for example,
self-driving cars [9].
It has attracted a lot of research interests in improving the
adversarial robustness of deep neural networks. [10] suggests
reducing the dimensionality of input data. [11] indicates that
their model is robust to adversarial examples putting Gaussian
processes on top of deep neural networks. Furthermore, [12]
developed the semi-supervised version of adversarial training
called Virtual Adversarial Training (VAT) where the output
distribution was smoothed with a regularization term.
To alleviate such issues, we present an alternative model
which equipts DNNs with the worst case misclassifi-
cation bound provided by Minimax Probability Machine
(MPM) [13]–[17], leading Deep Minimax Probability Machine
(DeepMPM). In essence, we put the MPM at the top of a deep
neural network, as shown in Figure 1. Through exploring a
powerful theorem [18], MPM can obtain the upper bound on
the probability of misclassification for future data, i.e., the
worst-case accuracy and hence leads to a robust classifier. In
contrast, for classification, the traditional DNNs only consider
the information of single example since they use softmax
classifier. Combining MPM with DNNs could inherit the good
advantages of both MPM and DNNs where robustness and
accuracy would be integrated. In details, DeepMPM could
take advantage of global information by introducing the global
statistics of data, i.e., the mean and covariance of data,
control misclassification probabilities robustly in the worst
case for future data, and do well in learning effective hidden
representation. In other words, applying MPM to DNNs can
make up for the inadequacy of DNNs and are more robust
to adversarial examples. Specifically, instead of maximizing
the likelihood of labels for data, we employ the objective
function of MPM to promote our model to take into account
global information. Importantly, we engage the Lagrangian
multiplier to optimize the DeepMPM which enables an end-
to-end training fashion.
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed model,
we perform evaluations on two benchmark datasets, MINST
and CIFAR-10, in two tasks including classification tasks and
robustness to adversarial examples. Experimental results have
demonstrated the encouraging performance. In particular, the
significant improvement over the state-of-the-art methods has
been observed in recognizing adversarial examples.
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Fig. 1. The graphical illustration of the DeepMPM model. The mainly
difference of the CNN and the DeepMPM is the final layer: one uses the
Softmax function, the other employs the MPM layer. This causes the two
models to be different in the optimization section as well. And the DeepMPM
obtains the means and covariance matrices of two classes through the powerful
representation of the DNN.
II. RELATED WORK
It has been shown that deep neural networks are often
vulnerable to adversarial examples. There is some literature
on how to improve the adversarial robustness m from different
perspectives. In the following, we present some literature on
adversarial robustness.
The first aspect of work is based on adversarial training,
specifically augmenting the training set with adversarial ex-
amples. It’s said that adversarial training can improve the ro-
bustness of deep neural networks to adversarial examples and
seems to hold the greatest promise. [19]–[25]. For instance, in
order to enhance the robustness of the neural networks, [24]
introduces adversarial training employing black-box attacks
from similar networks. [25] demonstrates that if the pertur-
bations calculated during training maximize the loss of the
model, adversarial training can be made robust to white-box
attacks. The two methods described above are only for the
specified attack method.
The second aspect of work is based on defensive distilla-
tion (i.e. transfer knowledge of complex networks to smaller
networks) [26], [27]. [26] employs knowledge of the network
to train the networks to increase robustness. [27] extends the
defensive distillation measure by addressing the numerical
instabilities encountered in [26].
Meanwhile, there exists work to modify the input to improve
the robustness [10], [28]. [10] points out that reducing the
dimensionality of original data can improve the adversarial
robustness of deep neural networks. [28] shows that training
neural networks with the input gradient regularization can
enhance robustness to transferred adversarial examples created
to fake out all of the other models. In addition, the inherent
characteristics of the model also affect robustness [29], [30].
[29] finds that the robustness can be improved by increas-
ing the capacity of the model. When this is used together
with adversarial training, the effect is more pronounced. [30]
demonstrates that sparse nonlinear deep neural networks are
more robust than their corresponding dense networks.
Deep neural networks can also combine the advantages of
other methods to increase their own robustness. [11] puts the
Gaussian process at the top of a DNN, achieving good classi-
fication and robustness. In this paper, we combine the MPM
with deep neural networks for the sake of their complementary
strengths in robustness learning.
III. DEEP MINIMAX PROBABILITY MACHINE
In this section, we first provide an introduction to MPM.
Further, we propose a novel model DeepMPM, which attempts
to optimize an MPM optimization targeting in an end-to-end
DNN fashion.
A. Minimax Probability Machine
Minimax Probability Machine (MPM) is proposed in [13]–
[17], which tries to minimize the upper bound of the prob-
ability of misclassification of future data in a worst-case
setting. No assumptions with respect to the data distribution
are required in MPM, while those assumptions lack generality
and are often invalid.
Let x and y denote random vectors with mean vectors
and covariance matrices given by x ∼ (x¯,Σx) and y ∼
(y¯,Σy) respectively in a binary classification problem, where
x, x¯,y, y¯ ∈ Rn and Σx,Σy ∈ Rn×n.
MPM seeks to determine the hyperplane a>z = b (a, z ∈
Rn and b ∈ R) which separates the two classes of data
with maximal probability. The form of the MPM model is
as follows:
max
α,a,b
α s.t. inf Pr{a>x ≥ b} ≥ α, (1)
inf Pr{a>y ≤ b} ≥ α.
where α denotes the worst-case accuracy of the future data.
Through a powerful theorem due to Isii [18], as extended by
[31], this finally can be transformed into a convex optimization
problem, as follows,
min
a
√
a>Σxa +
√
a>Σya s.t. a>(x¯− y¯) = 1, (2)
or, equivalently
min
a
‖Σ1/2x a‖+ ‖Σ1/2y a‖ s.t. a>(x¯− y¯) = 1. (3)
More specifically, this optimization problem is a second or-
der cone program problem [32]. After obtaining the optimal
solution a∗, b∗, for a new data point z, if a∗z ≥ b∗, z is
classified as the class x, otherwise z belongs to the class y.
In the following sections we will introduce DeepMPM.
B. DeepMPM
It is known that deep neural networks offer a powerful
representation mechanism, which could learn adaptive basis
functions focusing on local useful information. At the same
time, MPM can directly minimize the maximum probability
of misclassification with mean vectors and covariance matrices
of the data considering the global structural information.
Therefore, we combine the MPM with deep neural networks
for the sake of their complementary strengths in the classifi-
cation task and robustness learning, namely Deep Minimax
Probability Machine (DeepMPM). Specifically, we can inter-
pret our model as applying the MPM to the final hidden layer
of a deep neural network, instead of using softmax, as shown
in Figure 1.
Let g(x,w) denotes a nonlinear mapping given by a deep
neural network, parametrized by weight w. It can be said that
through a neural network, we obtain effective representation
for two classes of data, g(x,w) and g(y,w) respectively,
making mean vectors and covariance matrices reliable. In
details,
x ∼ (x¯,Σx)→ g(x,w) ∼ (g(x,w),Σg(x,w)), (4)
y ∼ (y¯,Σy)→ g(y,w) ∼ (g(y,w),Σg(y,w)), (5)
where g(x,w), g(y,w) denote mean vectors of two classes
of data respectively, and Σg(x,w),Σg(y,w) denote covariance
matrices of two classes of data respectively. For simplicity, we
omit the parameter w of g(·) in the following sections.
We desire a hyperplane a>g(z) = b that separates the
two classes of data points with maximal probability given the
means and covariance matrices obtaining by a deep neural
network. The formulation of our model is written as follows:
max
α,a,b
α s.t. inf Pr{a>g(x) ≥ b} ≥ α, (6)
inf Pr{a>g(y) ≤ b} ≥ α.
With the powerful theorem used by the MPM [18], the
optimized objective function of our model becomes,
min
a
√
a>Σg(x)a +
√
a>Σg(y)a, (7)
s.t. a>(g(x)− g(y)) = 1.
In order to train our model in an end-to-end fashion, we
employ the Lagrangian multiplier method to perform optimiza-
tion. With the introduction of a Lagrange multiplier λ, we can
minimize the objective function,
L =
√
a>Σg(x)a +
√
a>Σg(y)a + λ(a>(g(x)− g(y))− 1).
(8)
We would like to underline that we jointly learn all our
model parameters, φ = {w,a}, including w the weights of
the neural network, and a the parameter of the hyperplane
for the MPM. In addition, we train DeepMPM with back
propagation in an end-to-end fashion, using the chain rule to
calculate derivatives about all the parameters. Particularly, the
derivative of weight w is written as,
∂L
∂w
=
∂L
∂Σg(x)
∂Σg(x)
∂g(x)
∂g(x)
∂w
+
∂L
∂Σg(y)
∂Σg(y)
∂g(y)
∂g(y)
∂w
+
∂L
∂g(x)
∂g(x)
∂g(x)
∂g(x)
∂w
+
∂L
∂g(y)
∂g(y)
∂g(y)
∂g(y)
∂w
. (9)
We apply the Nesterov momentum version of mini-batch
SGD to optimize our model. Related methods have shown
that mini-batch learning of distribution parameters (in detail,
mean vectors and covariance matrices) is feasible if the batch
size is adequately large [33], [34].
With the optimized parameters φ∗ = {w∗,a∗}, we can
obtain b∗ and α∗ respectively, as follows,
b∗ = a>∗ g(x)−
√
a>∗ Σg(x)a∗√
a>∗ Σg(x)a∗ +
√
a>∗ Σg(w)a∗
. (10)
and
α∗ =
1
(
√
a∗>Σg(x)a∗ +
√
a∗>Σg(y)a∗)2 + 1
. (11)
α∗ represents the worst-case accuracy of the future data. In
general, traditional machine learning is fully data-driven, with
the goal of maximizing the accuracy of the known data in the
average sense, while our model is to maximize the accuracy
of the future data in the worst sense, which is more robust.
The label of a test instance can be given by
sign(a>∗ g(z,w∗) − b∗): if the formulation is +1, z is
classified as the class x, otherwise z is classified as the class
y.
For multi-class classification, one can train a neural network
with shared feature extraction and an integrated loss function
via the one-vs-others or one-vs-one schemes, and then com-
pare the α values for each class. Since the goal of this paper
is to provide a seminal work of extending DNNs with MPM
to evaluate its robustness, we leave this extension as the future
work.
IV. EXPERIMENT
We evaluate our model across multiple scenarios on two
datasets MNIST [35] and CIFAR-10 [36] respectively. Specif-
ically, we evaluate the performance of DeepMPM on classi-
fication tasks and compare the accuracy of two datasets in
the first place. Then we examine the robustness of our model
under the attacks of adversarial examples.
All experiments are performed on a Linux machine with
eight 4.0GHz CPU cores and 32GB RAM, one GTX 1080 Ti
GPU card with 12GB RAM. We implemented DNNs based
on Pytorch, a general deep learning platform.
A. Classification
In this subsection, we report the performance of our model
on binary classification tasks. In particular, we test our model
on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. As MPM is designed to
Fig. 2. The accuracy of ten binary classifiers on MNIST for FGSM attacks. The horizontal axis represents the size of . It’s seen that the Accuracy of the
DeepMPM decreases much more slowly with the size of adversarial perturbation for all ten classifiers. Thus, DeepMPM is more robust.
Fig. 3. The accuracy of ten binary classifiers from the FGSM attacks on CIFAR-10. DeepMPM’s accuracy decreases significantly slower with size of
adversarial perturbation.
solve binary classification problems, we train ten binary clas-
sifiers with CNN and DeepMPM. For each binary classifier,
we use the one-vs-others approach instead of the one-vs-one
approach.
For the experiments on MNIST, we exploit the network
architecture in the Pytorch basic MNIST example1 as the base
CNN, which contains two convolutional layers and two fully
connected layers, as shown in Table I.
CNN DeepMPM
Conv. (5 by 5, 10 channels)
Max pooling (2 by 2, padding is SAME)
Conv. (5 by 5, 20 channels)
Dropout
Max pooling (2 by 2, padding is SAME)
FC (to 50 units)
FC (to 2 units) MPM (to 1 unit)Softmax
TABLE I
THE CNN AND DEEPMPM ARCHITECTURES WE USE ON MNIST. THE FC
IS THE ABBREVIATION OF THE FULLY CONNECTED LAYER.
1available at https://github.com/pytorch/examples/tree/0.4/mnist
While CIFAR-10 contains images of more complicated ob-
jects, we employ a deeper network. The base CNN architecture
we use comes from [26] containing four convolutional layers
and two fully connected layers, as shown in Table II.
CNN DeepMPM
Conv. (3 by 3, 64 channels)
Conv. (3 by 3, 64 channels)
Max pooling (2 by 2, padding is SAME)
Conv. (3 by 3, 128 channels)
Conv. (3 by 3, 128 channels)
Max pooling (2 by 2, padding is SAME
FC (to 256 units)
FC (to 2 units) MPM (to 1 unit)Softmax
TABLE II
THE CNN AND DEEPMPM ARCHITECTURES WE USE ON
CIFAR-10.
The same training set is used for all the experiments.
Particularly, each model is trained end-to-end for 100 epochs,
and the learning rate decay would be performed on the 50th
and 80th epoch, with the decay factor as 0.1. Hyper-parameters
for CNN models and MPM models are set the same except for
the learning rate and momentum. We choose the small learning
rate and momentum empirically, since greater learning rates
and larger momentums would produce Inf in gradient. Namely,
the learning rate and momentum are set to 1e − 2 and 0.9
respectively for CNN models, while they are set to 1e−3 and
0.5 for DeepMPM models.
The accuracy of two comparison models on 10 tasks of
MNIST and CIFAR-10 are reported in Table III. DeepMPM
performs better than CNN on 4 out of 10 tasks for MNIST,
and the largest gap between our model and CNN on other 6
tasks is 0.11%. As for tasks on CIFAR-10, the average gap
between the accuracy of the two models is 0.31%. From the
results above, we could observe that our model could achieve
comparable performance with CNN (the state-of-art method)
on the ordinary classification tasks.
MNIST CIFAR-10
CNN DeepMPM CNN DeepMPM
0 99.86 99.78 95.95 95.55
1 99.83 99.86 97.71 97.13
2 99.76 99.69 93.95 94.10
3 99.80 99.83 92.42 92.08
4 99.87 99.80 94.55 94.37
5 99.82 99.83 94.84 94.59
6 99.77 99.66 96.31 95.81
7 99.72 99.70 96.48 96.18
8 99.84 99.68 97.35 97.15
9 99.57 99.60 97.43 96.96
TABLE III
THE ACCURACY OF THE TEN BINARY CLASSIFICATION TASKS OF MNIST
AND CIFAR-10 (%). IT SHOWS THAT THE DEEPMPM MODEL CAN
ACHIEVE COMPARABLE PERFORMANCE WITH THE CNN MODEL.
B. Robustness to adversarial examples
There is a large amount of literature on producing adver-
sarial examples with different methods [7], [8], [37], [38]
since [6] pointed out neural networks are always vulnerable
to adversarial examples. Adversarial examples are generated
data which have minor differences from original data yet can
mislead the deep networks to give the incorrect prediction.
Adversarial attacks can be divided into two categories, targeted
attacks and non targeted attacks respectively. Targeted attacks
are those trying to find a minimal permutation that leads the
classifier to the desired class prediction (target), while non-
targeted attacks only care about the case that the classifier
gives a different answer. In this paper, we focus on non-
targeted attacks. It is noted that non-targeted could actually
be viewed as targeted if classification tasks are all binary.
To validate the robustness of our model, we test the base
CNN and our model on two attacks: the Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [7] and the L2 optimization attack of Carlini
and Wagner [38].
1) The fast gradient sign method: The fast gradient sign
method (FGSM) [7] is a one shot method for generating
adversarial examples and can be considered as one special case
of generalized gradient regularized method later developed
in [8]. It tries to find the perturbation through the direction
of the sign function of the gradient, which can be calculated
by back-propagation. For a given image x, the perturbation
can be written as,
η =  sign(∇xJ(θ,x)), (12)
where J(θ,x) represents the model loss function with model
parameters,  is a small scalar value that controls the magni-
tude of the perturbation and sign(·) denotes the sign function.
Then the adversarial example x′ is computed as: x′ = x+ η.
For deep convolutional neural networks, the loss function
is given as cross-entropy, namely the likelihood of the target
class label. For our proposed DeepMPM model, the loss func-
tion is Equation (8) from the original MPM model. Attacks
are performed on the models trained for classification tasks
mentioned in the previous section.
To evaluate the robustness of our proposed model, we report
the accuracy of classifiers on test sets of MNIST and CIFAR-
10, with the magnitude factor  ranges from small to large.
For the MNIST experiment,  ranges from 0 to 1, with step
size 0.025. Meanwhile, in the CIFAR-10 experiment, we set
the value of ’s from 0 to 0.5, and gradually increase it by
0.02.
MNIST CIFAR-10
CNN DeepMPM CNN DeepMPM
0 CNN 0.00 94.09 0.00 89.71DeepMPM 99.99 89.50 98.16 0.00
1 CNN 0.00 99.66 0.00 95.35DeepMPM 99.47 88.00 98.73 0.05
2 CNN 0.01 97.96 0.00 77.81DeepMPM 99.98 78.95 96.15 0.01
3 CNN 0.00 98.74 0.00 77.81DeepMPM 99.95 86.64 97.58 0.00
4 CNN 0.13 98.50 0.00 85.65DeepMPM 99.91 86.90 97.83 0.00
5 CNN 0.00 98.88 0.00 89.48DeepMPM 99.93 89.00 97.28 0.00
6 CNN 0.00 95.25 0.00 87.19DeepMPM 99.97 89.93 97.96 0.01
7 CNN 0.00 99.65 0.00 95.40DeepMPM 99.92 88.59 94.17 0.11
8 CNN 0.00 91.00 0.00 89.86DeepMPM 99.89 88.14 98.40 0.03
9 CNN 0.00 97.85 0.00 66.30DeepMPM 99.89 87.93 97.77 0.22
TABLE IV
THE ACCURACY OF THE TEN BINARY CLASSIFICATION TASKS OF MNIST
AND CIFAR-10 OVER L2 C&W ATTACK EXAMPLES(%).
We report the accuracy of the model under self-attack
scenario in the first place, in Figure 2 (MNIST), and Figure 3
(CIFAR-10). Note that attacks are performed among examples
which are originally classified correctly. For the sake of
fairness, only examples that are correctly classified by both
models are tested. Therefore, at the starting point where 
is equal to 0, the accuracy of both models are 100%. For
MNIST, in Figure 2, it can be observed that the accuracy
Fig. 4. The accuracy of both models on MNIST when applying both models in the adversarial examples generated by CNN for the FGSM attacks (%). With
the adversarial examples generated by the CNN, although the DeepMPM performs worse than the case when applied to its own adversarial examples, its
accuracy is much higher than that of the CNN.
Fig. 5. The accuracy of both models on MNIST when applying both models in the adversarial examples generated by the DeepMPM for the FGSM attacks
(%). In order to see the change more clearly, the value of the vertical axis starts from 75%. When attacking the CNN model on adversarial examples generated
by the DeepMPM, the CNN has a great prediction on several binary classifications.
of DeepMPM remains high while that of the CNN model
reduces significantly as  increases. As for the harder CIFAR-
10 tasks, in Figure 3, though the accuracy decreases are
observed, DeepMPM still generates much better predictions
than CNN. The above results demonstrate the great robustness
of DeepMPM under FGSM attacks in the self-attack scenarios.
To illustrate the performance of the FSGM attack examples
transferred between different models, we plot the accuracy
of classifiers when both models are applied to adversarial
examples generated by the CNN model, as shown in Figure 4.
In this paper, We mainly present the experimental results
on the MNIST dataset. For the experiments on MNIST we
find that in most classifiers, although the DeepMPM model
performs worse than the case when applied to its own adver-
sarial examples, its accuracy is observed much higher than
the accuracy of CNN. This indicates that the performance of
DeepMPM is better than that of CNN.
We also show the accuracy of classifiers when two mod-
els are applied to adversarial examples generated by the
DeepMPM model, shown in Figure 5. Similarly, We mainly
present the experimental results on the MNIST dataset. The
accuracy of CNN has increased a lot compared to applying
to its own adversarial examples. And the accuracy of the two
models is almost the same.
From the Figure 4 and Figure 5, it can be seen that the
attack examples generated by the DeepMPM model are less
aggressive, while the attack examples generated by the CNN
model are universal.
2) L2 optimization attack of Carlini and Wagner: To further
validate the robustness of our model, we perform attacks with
the L2 optimization attack of Carlini and Wagner [38]. This
method finds the perturbation by minimizing the following
function,
‖η‖22 + cf(x + η). (13)
where c is a constant chosen by the binary search method and
f(·) we used is defined as below for non targeted attacks.
f(x′) = Z(x′)l −max{Z(x′)i : i 6= l}. (14)
Z(x′)i denotes the pre softmax predictions for the class i on
image x′, and l represents the correct class.
As no softmax function is carried out in our model, this
attack might fail in generating adversarial examples directly
from pre-softmax values like in CNN. It is known that we get
the prediction by the value of a>∗ g(z,w∗)− b∗: if the value is
greater than or equal to 0, the new point z is classified as the
class x, otherwise z is classified as the class y. We found that
the value of the equation S(a>∗ g(z,w∗)− b∗) could represent
the probability that a sample belongs to class x to some extent,
where S(·) denotes the sigmoid function, and the probability
that a sample belongs to class y can be obtained by the value of
the equation 1−S(a>∗ g(z,w∗)− b∗). Therefore, we reversely
calculate the pre-softmax values with the probabilities, which
is the same as done in [11]. Same as the implementation of
[38], we actually optimize η in a transformed space.
Different from the FGSM attack, L2 optimization adver-
sarial attack is an iterative attack which optimizes over an
example for multiple times. Thus the optimized adversarial
examples can easily reach rather a high attack success rate
than FGSM generated examples.
In Table IV, we report the accuracy of models over the
generated attack examples of L2 optimization of Carlini and
Wagner. The row represents the targeted model of attacks
while the column represents the model be tested on. As can be
observed, DeepMPM can recognize attack examples with high
confidence (87.36% averagely) under self-attack scenario for
MNIST while CNN got nearly 0% accuracy. For Cifar-10, both
models are perfectly attacked under self-attack examples, yet
DeepMPM’s accuracy suffers more on transfer attacks where
examples of one model are tested on the other. (It’s partly due
to the universality of CNN targeted examples.)
We also report the differences in magnitudes of pertur-
bation needed between DeepMPM and CNN, calculated by
L2MPM − L2CNN where L2MPM represents the distance
between DeepMPM attack example and original data, and
L2CNN as well. We only show the 4 classes of self-attacks
on Cifar-10, as shown in Figure 6.
From Figure 6, we could see magnitudes of perturbation
needed for DeepMPM is rather larger than that of CNN,
meaning the difficulty of attacking DeepMPM is greater,
proving the robustness of our model.
V. CONCLUSION
In order to alleviate the vulnerability of deep neural net-
works to adversarial attacks, we have proposed the Deep
Minimax Probability Machine (DeepMPM), applying MPM to
DNNs in an end-to-end fashion. Specifically, we put MPM on
top of a deep neural network, and instead of maximizing the
likelihood of labels for data, we employ the objective function
of MPM. DeepMPM is more robust intuitively since it takes
the global information into account and learns the worst-case
bound on the probability of misclassification of future data.
In practice, to evaluate the robustness of our proposed model,
two groups of tasks are performed on our DeepMPM including
classification and adversarial attacks on MNIST and Cifar-10.
Experimental results on classification show DeepMPM have
a competitive performance with CNN. The robustness of our
Fig. 6. The differences in magnitudes of perturbation needed between the
DeepMPM and the CNN.
model has also been fully demonstrated in two attacks, the
FSGM and the L2 optimization attack of C&W.
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